Home » Library (Page 26)
Category Archives: Library
What really happened with Google Premium Video — Part one: DRM killed the files
As Daniel pointed out on Tuesday (Another Example of Access Bad, Ownership Good), when Google shut down its premium video service on August 15, it was able to prevent customers who had bought and paid for videos from Google from ever watching those videos again. But there is a bit more to the story -- and it has implications for how government information is distributed.
In this, Part One of a two part look at the issues, we examine how Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies and proprietary software allowed Google to make it impossible for users to watch videos that they had bought from Google even though they had downloaded the video files onto their own computers. In Part Two we examine why this story is important for government information specialists and Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP) librarians.
While it wasn't obvious from the initial news stories about this, Google used DRM and proprietary software to deny access to files users had paid for and downloaded. Although the Government Printing Office (GPO) has not used identical techniques, it has experimented with similar ones and has never explicitly rejected use of techniques that could provide government a way to deny access to information even if users have copies of files on their own computers. More on that below.
Google's premium video-purchase-and-download service overlapped with with Google's YouTube-like service, Google Video, which offers streaming video without charge and some free downloads. But in early 2006, Google announced a service as part of Google Video that would allow users to pay to rent or buy certain videos (such as NBA basketball games and TV shows such as CSI) and it is that service that changed this week and those videos that people purchased that they no longer can watch.
YouTube and Google Video use "streaming" video technology so that you watch the stream of video as it comes to you. It is also possible to download videos in some cases. But the Google premium video service allowed users to pay for videos, download them, keep the video files, and watch them without streaming or re-streaming the content. Customers had the files on their own computers and could copy them and put them on different machines as if they really did "own" them. But there was a catch.
Actually, there were three catches. First, users of this service had to download and install the proprietary "Google Player" software. (The software was originally downloadable from http://video.google.com/playerdownload but even the Google cache of that page disappeared this week.) It served a similar function to Windows Media Player or Quicktime or other media players, but it used its own proprietary format (".gvi"). Only the Google Player could play Google Videos.
Second, you could watch the proprietary format using the proprietary player only if you were connected to the internet and authenticated yourself as the purchaser.
Since the Google Player was the only player that could read the files one purchased, users were locked-in to the DRM of authentication-over-the-internet (sometimes called the "phone home" feature). So, even if you paid for a video and "owned" the file you downloaded, you couldn't watch it unless Google allowed you to do so -- every time you watched it. This week Google simply turned off the ability for users to authenticate. Presumably, this is the way the Google rental service operated from the start: after 24 hours, you no longer had permission to view the file you downloaded. It turned out that the "purchase" program was just a temporary service as well.
This is why The Guardian described the situation this way:
Google handed opponents of digital rights management (DRM) a huge weapon this week when it announced that DRM-protected videos bought from its online video store will no longer work, and that customers will not be reimbursed.
-- Kiss goodbye to your DRM-protected Google Video clips, by Charles Arthur The Guardian, August 16 2007
And that brings us to the third catch: the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Although there are hacks, work-arounds, and other technical tricks that allow one to circumvent the Google phone-home DRM, they are against the law. Again, The Guardian saw the implication of this for libraries:
But the fact that thousands of purchased files will cease working will give pause to organisations charged with creating public archives of published information - such as the British Library and, in the US, the Library of Congress. The latter in particular was anyway considering whether any redrafting is needed on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA): the idea of offering a loophole to circumvent DRM on products that no longer work properly was rejected in its last consideration. Google's decision might lead to a reversal in thinking.
There is more about this story and its implications for FDLP libraries in Part Two.
More information:
- Google Video robs customers of the videos they "own", BoingBoing August 10, 2007
- Google Video service to go black by Dawn C. Chmielewski and Alex Pham Los Angeles Times, August 11, 2007
- Google's permanent video sales less-than-permanent by Cade Metz, The Register, August 11, 2007
- Google Video DRM: Why is Hollywood more important than users? by Cory Doctorow, BoingBoing, February 14, 2006
- More On Google Copy Protection by Mike Masnick, TechDirt, Mon, Jan 9th 2006
- Google's Copy Protection: Supplying The Tools For Others To Be Evil by Mike Masnick, TechDirt, Fri, Jan 6th 2006
- Google Video (beta) by Troy Dreier, CNet, 2/7/06
- Google Video Player Terms and Conditions Google Video
- Good Uses for DRM Jimmy Palmer, DRM Blog (September 2. 2005) [good description of "phone home" DRM]
Government Documents at the Crossroads [2001]
by Karrie Peterson, Elizabeth Cowell, and Jim Jacobs
American Libraries (Sept 2001) vol. 32 no. 8 p. 52-55.
The Internet and modern technologies have brought us to a crossroads, one that threatens the public's continued ability to access government information, as well as jeopardizes the permanent preservation of that information.
These technologies have brought into question the traditional (and highly effective) program for getting federal government information into the hands of the public--the Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP). New policies and practices for the FDLP have recently been adopted, and proposals for a major reorganization of the program are being floated. Various interests--politicians, librarians, the information industry--have differing views of the dissemination of government information to citizens. We need to ensure that wise choices are made--choices that ensure the right of every citizen to free, timely access.
Librarians have always viewed federal information policy issues in the context of their fundamental belief in the rights of a people to find out what their government is doing, or to reap the benefits of research, data collection, or other information activities conducted at the public expense. We respect the needs of library users to obtain information in a timely way, as well as the long-term needs of scholars and others to study and assess the official documentary history of our nation. In this view, the responsibility of our federal government to provide for information access is based on the beliefs of President James Madison, who wrote in 1822:
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps, both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a people who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives.
Today, an epochal change in government publishing practices--moving from paper to online access--could jeopardize the federal government's ability to keep the people informed. We must be vigilant if we are to ensure that new technology is used to expand rather than endanger the citizen access that Madison held in such high regard. In making the transition to e-government, we must look beyond the technological fanfare and examine carefully the decisions being made for our nation by politicians.
FDLP facts
The Federal Depository Library Program, which began in 1861, now distributes free official copies of government documents and publications to some 1,350 designated libraries across the land. The program grew out of the Madisonian belief that a strong democracy depended on the right of citizens to inform themselves about their government.
The Printing Act of 1895 also played a key role by establishing bibliographic control over government information through the Monthly Catalog and vastly increasing the types of government publications required for inclusion in depository distributions.
This basic arrangement has survived many difficulties, including an enormous growth in government printing in the 1970s, severe and often politically motivated cutbacks in collecting and publishing information in the 1980s and 1990s, and new formats from microfiche to CD-ROM.
Many recent trends have come to a head in the past year, starting with the annual battle over congressional appropriations. Continuing a decades-long march to cut the fat from government, some legislators proposed drastic cuts in the funding for the Government Printing Office (GPO), out of which the depository program is run. The House of Representatives especially proved themselves eager to save our money by defunding the agency most responsible for enabling our access to government publications. Although a significant public outcry reduced the size of the cuts, the funding reduction has pushed the GPO into making devastating cuts in the depository program. The shocking news is that the GPO will no longer provide paper (or other tangible format) documents to the 1,350 overlapping depository collections and there will now (with few exceptions) be only electronic access via the Web to government publications. This move, forced on depository libraries before problems of bibliographic control and permanent publ ic access are solved, drastically undermines citizens' ability to make use of government information for which they have already paid.
The Superintendent of Documents issued a new policy statement October 15,2000, on dissemination through the FDLP. The key element of the policy is that "the primary method of making publications available to the Federal Depository Library Program is online dissemination." Apart from a core list of some 40 essential publications, very few documents or publications will be distributed as part of the depository program; depository libraries will now mostly be pointing to their "collection" as electronic items on government servers. Some of these electronic publications will be on servers at the GPO, and some will be linked to by the GPO but remain on the Web sites of their agency "publishers."
Pondering the problems
This is not entirely malign. Electronic publishing is user-friendly in many ways. The Internet offers 24/7 accessibility from many locations, keyword searching, quick availability of timely documents, shelf-space savings in our libraries, and so on. Sophisticated technology watchers, though, already anticipate the many problems with this new model:
- When access is limited to a single electronic collection, there is no access when the GPO servers go down (as they do from time to time).
- When the government controls the only authentic copy of a document, there is nothing to prevent the government from intentionally or unintentionally corrupting, modifying, or even deleting that document, thus preventing access or changing the historical record.
- When a single electronic collection replaces 1,350 depository collections, the wide variety of selection, collection, and retention policies that address the needs of different communities is replaced with a single policy. Is this one-size-fits-all collection adequate for a diverse nation?
- When a government agency, short of funds, decides which publications are worthy of being distributed in print, will those decisions reflect citizen needs or will they reflect agency economics?
- Who will enforce the preservation of publications when the agency decides to remove a document from its Web site?
- Now that Congress has saved money by reducing the GPO budget, will it increase the budgets of those agencies that now must pay the cost of making their publications accessible on the Web?
- Is technology stabilized to the point where we are really saving money from a mostly online dissemination process, or are we shortsightedly sacrificing daily reliability and long-term access?
- What new barriers will be faced by those without computers who want to access government information?
Another fundamental issue that we must examine is that of the longstanding tradition of free government information. Any librarian who lived through the privatization frenzy of the 1980s knows that free government information comes at the price of eternal vigilance. Recently, for-profit companies have proposed that many services of e-government--so convenient for citizens--are the province of the private sector. An October 2000 report from the Computer and Communications Industry Association has even gone so far as to suggest that it would be wrong for the IRS to offer free online tax preparation software to citizens because it would compete with the value that can be gained by commercial tax preparers and tax attorneys! Sadly, some misguided politicians and bureaucrats even now use the lucrative sales of government information to the private sector to supplement their budgets. They do not see that they are forcing citizens to pay twice for information: once with their tax money for the collection of the inf ormation and again with user fees for access to the information.
These problems and as-yet-unresolved questions are important, but they are not nearly as vital as this question: What will it mean for our nation to shift from a tradition of widely dispersed, locally owned and controlled collections of government publications, organized and preserved by dedicated and public-service-oriented librarians, to a system in which the government holds and controls most of our government information?
It is true that we have not gone very far down this road--yet. Let us imagine what the future might hold for government information.
Think for a moment about the multidimensional nature of government information. Government publications can be the basis for interactive services such as filing taxes, submitting a bid to sell goods or services to an agency, and voting in elections. Government publications are also a documentary record of official behavior and enable the citizenry to influence proposed policies, respond to actions taken, or assess events years down the road. Government information also includes the fair and open publication of the laws and regulations by which we all have agreed to abide. Research funded at the public expense and reported back to the funding agency is also part of the picture. Lastly, there are the many publications that are ephemeral in nature but produced for the convenience of all-for example, pamphlets about the National Parks.
Ticklish questions
Taking a broader view and looking at all types of government information poses some ticklish questions: Are we going to be truly comfortable with an arrangement in which controversial reports are suddenly yanked from executive agency Web sites when corporations named in the reports push the right political levers? Do we really want to place ourselves in the position of having to mount nationwide protests to restore such items that could have been part of our local library collections if they had been deposited in our local libraries?
An even more disturbing hypothetical scenario involves subtle "editing" of documents housed on agency servers without anyone being the wiser. If you think that is unlikely, consider for a moment the Congressional Record--supposedly the daily record of what is spoken in the House or the Senate, but subject to after the-fact revision by any senator or representative who wants to reshape his or her remarks, or even insert items never alluded to on the floor. Equally problematic is the possibility of newer versions of data being quietly inserted into a published report, causing incalculable scholarly confusion.
In July, the Government Printing Office backed off from a threat to recall a controversial volume documenting U.S. involvement in the overthrow of Indonesia's first president, Achmed Sukarno (see News Fronts Washington, this issue). If the document had been available only through a government Web site, it seems much more likely that the agency would have carried through its plan.
Should we worry so much about government control of government information, given that we live in such a benevolent democracy? Or do we enjoy our democratic rights precisely because people throughout our history have worried about too much government control?
These are the problems with the new FDLP policies. What are the solutions? It is unlikely that the government will be willing to eschew the tremendous advantages of online publication until all problems are satisfactorily addressed. One solution, then, is to treat new digital publications within the framework of the depository program in the same way as we have treated other publishing changes: We should adapt our libraries to include electronic files of government publications and include them in our growing digital collections. Instead of only providing access to Web-based documents, the GPO could acquire and make available for selection by depositories the digital versions of government documents. With multiple copies available for inspection across the land, in the same way as in the world of paper-and-ink publishing, the government would still have the responsibility to disseminate its information, but we would retain local control.
In addition to solving many of the problems enumerated above, this approach would provide other advantages. Multiple copies, physically deposited at libraries, give us an automatic preservation hedge against loss or corruption of the "last copy" of any particular item. Having multiple collections throughout the nation, each responsible to a particular group of users, would also ensure that every document that is of value to some constituency would find a long-term home and not be subject to being discarded as being of marginal value from a single, monolithic, national, government-controlled collection.
These distributed collections also have a strength that a single, national collection that includes only government information cannot have. Each of the many libraries with depository collections also has other nongovernment publications that provide a more complete and accurate record of any given subject. Such nongovernment publications include private-sector products that help people use government information as well as journals, monographs, technical reports, and other publications from nongovernment sources.
Who will decide which course we take? Library users are not likely to be the first to sound the alarm as complex technical decisions begin to mask encroachment on their access to free government information. It is more likely that librarians will be the first to notice when government data arrives wrapped inside the proprietary software of a private company condemning it to a short lifespan; or when the document we accessed from an agency Web site yesterday is gone today; or when our OPACs begin to fill with records containing bad URLS, or when a report mysteriously loses a chapter that it had a week ago; or when the collection of some key economic data is farmed out to a commercial firm, available from its Web site as long as it is profitable to the company to provide it.
It would be nice to think that technological advances automatically contribute to improved access to government information and that we are all marching to the beat of the same drummer in putting technology to use. Sadly, the truth is that there is nothing automatic about technology here-- the same social, political, and economic forces that we balanced in the print world of government information are still at play in the electronic realm. Because the pronouncements and policy decisions being made are cloaked in technological jargon, it is too easy to miss the political implications of the policies and fail to see how our rights to gain access to government information are affected.
Fighting for access
If librarians are to provide the leadership for citizens in this fight for access to government information, we will have to accomplish several things: We must understand that technical decisions are political and public-policy decisions. The fight is not about technology but about policy. We will have to be bold in our questioning of government policies and practices and outspoken in response to bad policy changes. We must not excuse bad policies as if they are the only possible response to funding cuts, and we must hold Congress accountable for how it allocates our money. We will have to use our professional organizations effectively to educate ourselves about the real implications of technological advances for our users. We will have to become much better at educating and organizing our users--be they researchers, students, journalists, faculty, citizen activists, or the public at large. We need to form alliances with other groups who monitor federal information policy. We must develop our own vision of w hat the FDLP should look like in the new millennium in order to provide the democratic protections that our fellow citizens deserve.
This will not be the end of the fight either. As technology advances, government information will begin to look less like publications and more like the digital equivalent of loose-leaf services. Information will not be prepackaged as much as presented based on user requests and user profiles. The boundary between government publications and government services will blur and become difficult to define. When that happens, will we still live in a world of free public information, or will the private sector prevail in defining the government's role as that of collecting information and the private-sector role as that of adding "value-added services" for which the public must pay? If today we give up our rights under Title 44 of the U.S. Code to have all documents, including digital ones, deposited, we will have little ground left to fight on when the more difficult battles come.
This is a tall order, no doubt about it. However, the way that librarians approach this struggle to maintain free and open access to government information will have an enormous effect on our social landscape in years to come. The fight to preserve democratic rights is just; and if the battles are hard, the rewards of success are commensurately great.
At the time this article was written, KARRIE PETERSON was government information librarian, ELIZABETH COWELL was head of data, government, and geographic information services, and JIM JACOBS was data services librarian, all at the University of California, San Diego. At the time of this posting (2007), Peterson is Director of the Edwin Ginn Library, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, Cowell is U.S. Government Documents Librarian, Stanford University Libraries, and Jacobs is Librarian Emeritus, University of California, San Diego. Continue reading
GPO, LOCKSS, IP Authentication, and the future of FDLP — more clarification needed
If you have not had a chance to read the message from Joseph P. Paskoski (Clarification on GPO LOCKSS report), I encourage you to do so. It does indeed help clarify GPO's intentions in ways that, I believe, seriously endanger long-term, free, public access to government information.
For those confused by the recent thread about GPO, LOCKSS, and IP authentication, allow me to try to summarize what we now know:
GPO is not "advocating" use of IP authentication for LOCKSS.
On the other hand, GPO is considering "an exclusive service for depository libraries" and is recommending exploring "other user authentication options" to implement such a system.
Further, GPO is only willing to "consider" (not guarantee) making content available without user authentication. This is evidently true of FDsys as well as any use of LOCKSS.
To me, this means that GPO is, indeed, planning a two-tier system of digital distribution: one exclusively for depository libraries (and, presumably, free) and, by implication, a second system presumably for the general public and based on cost recovery.
For this to work, GPO would have to do two things. First, it would have to restrict what FDLP libraries can do with the content they receive, either through technological locks or limitations, or licensing restrictions (including restrictions on re-distribution). Second, if GPO offered any content to the general public for free, it would have to offer similarly technologically dumbed-down, less-than-fully-functional, non-reusable content -- much the way Amazon offers one-page-at-a-time viewing of books as a teaser to get you to purchase the entire book. (For more on this see Why does GPO want to use IP Authentication?)
This model seems clear: distribution to depository libraries for free, but with limitations on use, location, and so forth; and distribution to the general public for a fee.
This sounds like an implementation of what GPO's strategic vision promised: a commitment to "free and ready public access to" government information "in partnership with Federal Depository libraries" while maintaining a separate, fee-based channel to meet its commitment to "distribute, on a cost recovery basis, copies of printed and electronic documents and other government information products to the general public," [emphasis added] (A strategic vision for the 21st century).
Why is this a threat to long-term, free, public access to government information? Imagine what such a system would look like to your users: They could use the net to get what they need, but they may have to pay or use a dumbed-down version. Or they could go offline, go to their library and use a "free" version, which would also have DRM or licensing restrictions, or both.
This is a far cry from DLC's underlying assumption that "much of the access to federal information resources is available 24/7 on the Internet" (Knowledge Will Forever Govern" A Vision Statement For Federal Depository Libraries In The 21st Century).
What this sounds like to me is a revival of the GPO bookstore concept for the digital age with the (fee-based) bookstore as the primary means of access to most government information and the go-to-the-library-building FDLP as the "free" path. This puts libraries and free access as second-tiers, non-networked alternatives for users. It would mean that libraries would be unable to participate in the open and free flow and re-use of government information (Web 2.0, Semantic Web, etc.). It is a vision of government information closer to Jack Valenti's vision of movie distribution than to Jefferson or Madison's visions of government information.
Imagine what this would mean to FDLP libraries and their ability to preserve access to information. Would systems like LOCKSS even be permitted? Or would locked-down-with-DRM or technologically-dumbed-down free versions made available to libraries be technically (or by license) un-preseravable?
I may be misinterpreting GPO's statements and I hope I am. I would welcome hearing further clarifications from GPO including that it does not intend to use DRM and that it does not intend to restrict what FDLP libraries or others can do with free content. I would welcome hearing from GPO that it does not intend to provide dumbed-down or technologically locked or functionally-disabled content for free while providing fully-functional content for a fee. I invite GPO to commit itself to open, free, reusable, preservable, distributable, unencumbered, fully-functional government information. I urge DLC to insist on digital distribution so that FDLP libraries can be fully functional online partners in the organization and preservation of government information and not by-standers who hope GPO will get funding to do so.
GPO could also show its good faith by continuing to study LOCKSS as one (not the exclusive) method of preservation and not just a method for distribution. The project could be expanded to include more than just e-journals. GPO could evaluate automated harvesting using tools that automatically create new directory structures and actively seek ways to help other depository libraries participate (e.g., reviewing automated harvesting).
Perhaps there can be some discussion of these issues at DLC.
Until we get further clarification, we'll all be left wondering.
Continue readingGPO LOCKSS Report: Why does GPO want to use IP Authentication?
GPO's report (GPO LOCKSS Pilot: Final Analysis, Government Printing Office, April 12, 2007), which analyzes the LOCKSS technology and announces GPO's findings and "future recommendations" on using LOCKSS, refers repeatedly to use of IP Authentication*. The document does not, however, discuss the need for IP authentication either in the pilot or in possible future implementations of LOCKSS for government information.
Since LOCKSS does not require IP Authentication, this raises interesting questions.
While it is reasonable to assume that GPO wanted to limit access to the documents it was using for the LOCKSS pilot project to those who were participating in the project, it is not clear why GPO would consider IP Authentication necessary for a live implementation of LOCKSS. But the report clearly states as an "Outstanding Issue":
IP authentication for over 1260 depositories would be cumbersome, and may not be cost effective in relation to the benefit received. (page 6)
And, later, the report stresses the costs of IP Authentication:
LOCKSS technology in itself appears to be relatively cost efficient as a distribution mechanism. Costs appear to be a bigger issue in relation to staff time required to ... administer IP authentication. (page 11)
Since the report does not explain why it would want to use IP Authentication for LOCKSS, we can only speculate why it includes it as a cost. Here are my speculations. I pose them as questions and would welcome answers from GPO.
- Is GPO planning to set up a special distribution system for depository libraries only? This would make sense if GPO wants to use this special distribution channel to meet its commitment to "free and ready public access to" government information "in partnership with Federal Depository libraries" while maintaining a separate, fee-based channel to meet its commitment to "distribute, on a cost recovery basis, copies of printed and electronic documents and other government information products to the general public," [emphasis added] (A strategic vision for the 21st century). For this to work, GPO would have to restrict what FDLP libraries can do with the content they receive, either through technological locks or limitations, or licensing restrictions. We have already seen a precursor to the use of licensing restricitions with the Library of Congress Subject Headings (See: GPO details onerous restrictions on digital materials). This seems to me the most likely reason for the inclusion of IP authentication in the report because it fits in well with the contradictory missions noted above of providing information for free and for a fee and with GPO's previous experience with this very contradiction. (Years ago, when GPO tried to charge for GPO Access, it tried to limit free use of it to those physically inside depository libraries. When that failed because libraries made the same content available on the net, GPO was forced to go to a model of making "it free to the general public." But, as Bruce James said, "This cannot continue." [See Summary, 2003 Fall Meeting Depository Library Council.]) The new model seems clear: "Free" to depository libraries, but with limitations on use, location, and so forth; and "Fee" to the general public.
- Is GPO planning a separate, FDLP-only distribution channel as a way of providing "authentication" of content? This would fit in well with GPO's consistently stated intention of being a "single authoritative resource" for digital Federal documents (A Strategic Vision). Information distributed through such a limited access channel could come with a special cachet of "being deposited" and FDLP libraries and no one else would be able to claim a special authenticity to such distribution. I do not think that it would be either necessary or wise to limit "authenticity" in this way, but, perhaps someone at GPO is thinking along those lines?
- Did those who wrote the report fail to consult policy makers within GPO and make a faulty assumption that GPO wants IP Authentication? This would indicate either that the report is incomplete or badly done.
- Did those who wrote the report fail to understand the technology they were describing and think IP Authentication was necessary to implement LOCKSS? This would also indicate that the report, and perhaps the entire evaluation process, was flawed badly.
- Is IP Authentication just a red-herring intended to confuse the issue, raise the theoretical costs of implementation, and provide evidence for GPO's conclusion that LOCKSS won't work for GPO? This would indicate that GPO, which in its own words only took on the pilot project after receiving "requests from research institutions, universities, depository libraries, and other Federal Government agencies to investigate using LOCKSS", never considered LOCKSS as a viable alternative. Indeed the report makes this fairly clear when it says that it "agreed" to the pilot project to test the LOCKSS technology "...as a potential precursor to GPO’s Future Digital System (FDsys)." [emphasis added]
None of these speculations are encouraging. They lead me to conclusions that do not augur well for free public access to public information. Again, I would welcome a response from GPO.
* In a library environment, "IP Authentication" normally refers to a process that allows access to licensed content. For example, the library subscribes to a journal collection or database and pays the vendor fees that allow certain computers (e.g. all those on a campus) to have access to that content. The library sends the addresses of those computers ("IP addresses") to the publisher. The publisher maintains a service that allows any request from one of those machines to get content. For more information, see Offering remote access to restricted resources by Marshall Breeding, Information Today, Volume 18 Number 18 (May 2001) p52-53.
Depository libraries can use IP Authentication to allow two and only two machines to have access to STAT-USA. (See "STAT-USA Offers Depositories IP Authentication Access" in Administrative Notes Newsletter of the Federal Depository Library Program Vol. 27, no. 03-04 GP 3.16/3-2:27/03-04 March 15/April 15, 2006.)
Continue reading
What really happened with Google Premium Video — Part Two: Why Google Video story should scare you
August 18, 2007 / Leave a comment
In Part One we examined how Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies and proprietary software allowed Google to make it impossible for users to watch videos that they had bought from Google even though they had downloaded the video files onto their own computers. In this part we examine why this story is important for government information specialists and Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP) librarians.
There are two connections between this story about commercial content -- like TV shows being sold for profit -- and non-copyrighted government information that is supposed to be freely available:
First, the government may want to restrict access to information and may welcome tools that make this easier. Certainly with the removal of government information from the web, the re-classification of previously declassified information, and the removal of information that was once available in the National Archives, government agencies have demonstrated an increasing willingness to control access to information -- even after its release to the public. (See "More Information" below for links to stories about these events.)
We are seeing the evolution of this most publicly with the Foreign Relations of the United States series. In 2001, the CIA wanted to cease distribution of a volume that was already printed and sent to depository libraries but, in the end, the volumes were distributed because "Destroying them would be a huge public relations disaster for the U.S. government.... Book burning is definitely not a politically correct thing to do." (State Dept Mulls "Book Burning", Secrecy News, September 21, 2001). By 2006, we saw an example of the next stage in this evolutionary process of control of public information: long delays in the release of documents as an attempt to avoid the embarrassing situation of recalling documents. A volume had been nearly ready for publication for over seven years, but intelligence screeners would not permit the release because of a handful of documents (Controversial FRUS volume release -- with a caveat...). This leads us to ask how long it will be before the government starts "releasing" documents that they can "recall" technologically without the embarrassing problem of gathering books and burning them -- without even having to notify FDLP librarians and asking them to withdraw something. And, in the Google Video premium service story, we can see a real-life example of existing technology that allows this to be done.
Second, whether the government intends to restrict access to its information or not, policies change, budgets constrict, and intentions evolve. As Daniel pointed out "...Google didn't start up the service with the intention of shutting it down..." Nevertheless, in the end, they did shut it down. In addition, when the government relies on commercial tools for digital information distribution, those tools can impose the rules for distribution and use of information that the government cannot change. We have seen how government cannot always afford to do things in an open way and is forced by costs to do things that restrict access (e.g., FEMA requires Internet Explorer and What the Copyright Office / Internet Explorer rule tells us about government information and GPO's Budget and Priorities). Lawrence Lessig has documented the process of how technology can all too easily supersede good intentions and even the law in Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace.
How hypothetical is this? So far, we have been pretty lucky that the government has not explicitly implemented these kinds of technological information control. But we have seen precursors. In 2004, The Government Printing Office (GPO) released its own annual report using a proprietary reader that requires registration, includes DRM, and has built in "audit controls" (Annual Report 2004 Zinio Interactive Version (Registration Required) -> Get the GPO 2004 Annual Report in digital form now!). Most recently, we have seen GPO use proprietary software with the "call home" feature to authenticate documents in its Authenticated Public and Private Laws, Beta Release. With this system "Users must be connected to the Internet in order to have the ability to validate a digital signature on a PDF document." While the document is still readable if a user is not connected to the Internet, the user cannot validate the document. While the document is readable using software other than Adobe Acrobat or Reader version 7 or later, validation does not work without this proprietary software.
In summary, Google video used proprietary software with phone-home DRM to deny access to files that users had legally paid for and downloaded. GPO has used and is using proprietary software for distribution of government information and it is using DRM "phone home" features in its attempt to technologically "authenticate" government documents. While GPO certainly is not claiming that it wants to withdraw access to distributed publications, the technology is there for it to do so and it is experimenting with it.
Think of the Google Video premium service story as a useful cautionary tale -- a warning of how information can be withdrawn even if digital files were deposited with FDLP libraries or downloaded by conscientious librarians and digital preservation projects. This is something that government information specialists, FDLP librarians, and citizens should be watching closely. I urge you to write your Congressional delegation and the copyright office and suggest an explicit government document exemption to the DMCA. And write GPO and ask for an explicit, written policy rejecting the use of DRM and proprietary software and proprietary formats.
More information
- Homefront Confidential Prepared by The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, SIXTH EDITION, September 2005, "How the War on Terrorism Affects Access to Information and the Public's Right to Know"
- Chronology of Disappearing Government Information (Data collected through May 8, 2002) Compiled by Barbara Miller for ALA/GODORT Education Committee With special assistance of Karrie Peterson
- Secret reclassification of US documents by Michele McGinnis, (2006-02-21)
- Secret Agreement Reveals Covert Program to Hide Reclassification from Public by James R. Jacobs (2006-04-20)
- The Technical is Political by James A. Jacobs and Karrie Peterson, Of Significance... 3(1) 2001, p.25-35. Association of Public Data Users. (Full text PDF file)
Continue reading →Continue Reading →