Author Archives: James A Jacobs

If you have not had a chance to read the message from Joseph P. Paskoski (Clarification on GPO LOCKSS report), I encourage you to do so. It does indeed help clarify GPO's intentions in ways that, I believe, seriously endanger long-term, free, public access to government information.

For those confused by the recent thread about GPO, LOCKSS, and IP authentication, allow me to try to summarize what we now know:

GPO is not "advocating" use of IP authentication for LOCKSS.

On the other hand, GPO is considering "an exclusive service for depository libraries" and is recommending exploring "other user authentication options" to implement such a system.

Further, GPO is only willing to "consider" (not guarantee) making content available without user authentication. This is evidently true of FDsys as well as any use of LOCKSS.

To me, this means that GPO is, indeed, planning a two-tier system of digital distribution: one exclusively for depository libraries (and, presumably, free) and, by implication, a second system presumably for the general public and based on cost recovery.

For this to work, GPO would have to do two things. First, it would have to restrict what FDLP libraries can do with the content they receive, either through technological locks or limitations, or licensing restrictions (including restrictions on re-distribution). Second, if GPO offered any content to the general public for free, it would have to offer similarly technologically dumbed-down, less-than-fully-functional, non-reusable content -- much the way Amazon offers one-page-at-a-time viewing of books as a teaser to get you to purchase the entire book. (For more on this see Why does GPO want to use IP Authentication?)

This model seems clear: distribution to depository libraries for free, but with limitations on use, location, and so forth; and distribution to the general public for a fee.

This sounds like an implementation of what GPO's strategic vision promised: a commitment to "free and ready public access to" government information "in partnership with Federal Depository libraries" while maintaining a separate, fee-based channel to meet its commitment to "distribute, on a cost recovery basis, copies of printed and electronic documents and other government information products to the general public," [emphasis added] (A strategic vision for the 21st century).

Why is this a threat to long-term, free, public access to government information? Imagine what such a system would look like to your users: They could use the net to get what they need, but they may have to pay or use a dumbed-down version. Or they could go offline, go to their library and use a "free" version, which would also have DRM or licensing restrictions, or both.

This is a far cry from DLC's underlying assumption that "much of the access to federal information resources is available 24/7 on the Internet" (Knowledge Will Forever Govern" A Vision Statement For Federal Depository Libraries In The 21st Century).

What this sounds like to me is a revival of the GPO bookstore concept for the digital age with the (fee-based) bookstore as the primary means of access to most government information and the go-to-the-library-building FDLP as the "free" path. This puts libraries and free access as second-tiers, non-networked alternatives for users. It would mean that libraries would be unable to participate in the open and free flow and re-use of government information (Web 2.0, Semantic Web, etc.). It is a vision of government information closer to Jack Valenti's vision of movie distribution than to Jefferson or Madison's visions of government information.

Imagine what this would mean to FDLP libraries and their ability to preserve access to information. Would systems like LOCKSS even be permitted? Or would locked-down-with-DRM or technologically-dumbed-down free versions made available to libraries be technically (or by license) un-preseravable?

I may be misinterpreting GPO's statements and I hope I am. I would welcome hearing further clarifications from GPO including that it does not intend to use DRM and that it does not intend to restrict what FDLP libraries or others can do with free content. I would welcome hearing from GPO that it does not intend to provide dumbed-down or technologically locked or functionally-disabled content for free while providing fully-functional content for a fee. I invite GPO to commit itself to open, free, reusable, preservable, distributable, unencumbered, fully-functional government information. I urge DLC to insist on digital distribution so that FDLP libraries can be fully functional online partners in the organization and preservation of government information and not by-standers who hope GPO will get funding to do so.

GPO could also show its good faith by continuing to study LOCKSS as one (not the exclusive) method of preservation and not just a method for distribution. The project could be expanded to include more than just e-journals. GPO could evaluate automated harvesting using tools that automatically create new directory structures and actively seek ways to help other depository libraries participate (e.g., reviewing automated harvesting).

Perhaps there can be some discussion of these issues at DLC.

Until we get further clarification, we'll all be left wondering.

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GPO's report (GPO LOCKSS Pilot: Final Analysis, Government Printing Office, April 12, 2007), which analyzes the LOCKSS technology and announces GPO's findings and "future recommendations" on using LOCKSS, refers repeatedly to use of IP Authentication*. The document does not, however, discuss the need for IP authentication either in the pilot or in possible future implementations of LOCKSS for government information.

Since LOCKSS does not require IP Authentication, this raises interesting questions.

While it is reasonable to assume that GPO wanted to limit access to the documents it was using for the LOCKSS pilot project to those who were participating in the project, it is not clear why GPO would consider IP Authentication necessary for a live implementation of LOCKSS. But the report clearly states as an "Outstanding Issue":

IP authentication for over 1260 depositories would be cumbersome, and may not be cost effective in relation to the benefit received. (page 6)

And, later, the report stresses the costs of IP Authentication:

LOCKSS technology in itself appears to be relatively cost efficient as a distribution mechanism. Costs appear to be a bigger issue in relation to staff time required to ... administer IP authentication. (page 11)

Since the report does not explain why it would want to use IP Authentication for LOCKSS, we can only speculate why it includes it as a cost. Here are my speculations. I pose them as questions and would welcome answers from GPO.

1. Is GPO planning to set up a special distribution system for depository libraries only? This would make sense if GPO wants to use this special distribution channel to meet its commitment to "free and ready public access to" government information "in partnership with Federal Depository libraries" while maintaining a separate, fee-based channel to meet its commitment to "distribute, on a cost recovery basis, copies of printed and electronic documents and other government information products to the general public," [emphasis added] (A strategic vision for the 21st century). For this to work, GPO would have to restrict what FDLP libraries can do with the content they receive, either through technological locks or limitations, or licensing restrictions. We have already seen a precursor to the use of licensing restricitions with the Library of Congress Subject Headings (See: GPO details onerous restrictions on digital materials). This seems to me the most likely reason for the inclusion of IP authentication in the report because it fits in well with the contradictory missions noted above of providing information for free and for a fee and with GPO's previous experience with this very contradiction. (Years ago, when GPO tried to charge for GPO Access, it tried to limit free use of it to those physically inside depository libraries. When that failed because libraries made the same content available on the net, GPO was forced to go to a model of making "it free to the general public." But, as Bruce James said, "This cannot continue." [See Summary, 2003 Fall Meeting Depository Library Council.]) The new model seems clear: "Free" to depository libraries, but with limitations on use, location, and so forth; and "Fee" to the general public.
2. Is GPO planning a separate, FDLP-only distribution channel as a way of providing "authentication" of content? This would fit in well with GPO's consistently stated intention of being a "single authoritative resource" for digital Federal documents (A Strategic Vision). Information distributed through such a limited access channel could come with a special cachet of "being deposited" and FDLP libraries and no one else would be able to claim a special authenticity to such distribution. I do not think that it would be either necessary or wise to limit "authenticity" in this way, but, perhaps someone at GPO is thinking along those lines?
3. Did those who wrote the report fail to consult policy makers within GPO and make a faulty assumption that GPO wants IP Authentication? This would indicate either that the report is incomplete or badly done.
4. Did those who wrote the report fail to understand the technology they were describing and think IP Authentication was necessary to implement LOCKSS? This would also indicate that the report, and perhaps the entire evaluation process, was flawed badly.
5. Is IP Authentication just a red-herring intended to confuse the issue, raise the theoretical costs of implementation, and provide evidence for GPO's conclusion that LOCKSS won't work for GPO? This would indicate that GPO, which in its own words only took on the pilot project after receiving "requests from research institutions, universities, depository libraries, and other Federal Government agencies to investigate using LOCKSS", never considered LOCKSS as a viable alternative. Indeed the report makes this fairly clear when it says that it "agreed" to the pilot project to test the LOCKSS technology "...as a potential precursor to GPO’s Future Digital System (FDsys)." [emphasis added]

None of these speculations are encouraging. They lead me to conclusions that do not augur well for free public access to public information. Again, I would welcome a response from GPO.

* In a library environment, "IP Authentication" normally refers to a process that allows access to licensed content. For example, the library subscribes to a journal collection or database and pays the vendor fees that allow certain computers (e.g. all those on a campus) to have access to that content. The library sends the addresses of those computers ("IP addresses") to the publisher. The publisher maintains a service that allows any request from one of those machines to get content. For more information, see Offering remote access to restricted resources by Marshall Breeding, Information Today, Volume 18 Number 18 (May 2001) p52-53.

Depository libraries can use IP Authentication to allow two and only two machines to have access to STAT-USA. (See "STAT-USA Offers Depositories IP Authentication Access" in Administrative Notes Newsletter of the Federal Depository Library Program Vol. 27, no. 03-04 GP 3.16/3-2:27/03-04 March 15/April 15, 2006.)

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