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What really happened with Google Premium Video — Part Two: Why Google Video story should scare you
In Part One we examined how Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies and proprietary software allowed Google to make it impossible for users to watch videos that they had bought from Google even though they had downloaded the video files onto their own computers. In this part we examine why this story is important for government information specialists and Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP) librarians.
There are two connections between this story about commercial content -- like TV shows being sold for profit -- and non-copyrighted government information that is supposed to be freely available:
First, the government may want to restrict access to information and may welcome tools that make this easier. Certainly with the removal of government information from the web, the re-classification of previously declassified information, and the removal of information that was once available in the National Archives, government agencies have demonstrated an increasing willingness to control access to information -- even after its release to the public. (See "More Information" below for links to stories about these events.)
We are seeing the evolution of this most publicly with the Foreign Relations of the United States series. In 2001, the CIA wanted to cease distribution of a volume that was already printed and sent to depository libraries but, in the end, the volumes were distributed because "Destroying them would be a huge public relations disaster for the U.S. government.... Book burning is definitely not a politically correct thing to do." (State Dept Mulls "Book Burning", Secrecy News, September 21, 2001). By 2006, we saw an example of the next stage in this evolutionary process of control of public information: long delays in the release of documents as an attempt to avoid the embarrassing situation of recalling documents. A volume had been nearly ready for publication for over seven years, but intelligence screeners would not permit the release because of a handful of documents (Controversial FRUS volume release -- with a caveat...). This leads us to ask how long it will be before the government starts "releasing" documents that they can "recall" technologically without the embarrassing problem of gathering books and burning them -- without even having to notify FDLP librarians and asking them to withdraw something. And, in the Google Video premium service story, we can see a real-life example of existing technology that allows this to be done.
Second, whether the government intends to restrict access to its information or not, policies change, budgets constrict, and intentions evolve. As Daniel pointed out "...Google didn't start up the service with the intention of shutting it down..." Nevertheless, in the end, they did shut it down. In addition, when the government relies on commercial tools for digital information distribution, those tools can impose the rules for distribution and use of information that the government cannot change. We have seen how government cannot always afford to do things in an open way and is forced by costs to do things that restrict access (e.g., FEMA requires Internet Explorer and What the Copyright Office / Internet Explorer rule tells us about government information and GPO's Budget and Priorities). Lawrence Lessig has documented the process of how technology can all too easily supersede good intentions and even the law in Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace.
How hypothetical is this? So far, we have been pretty lucky that the government has not explicitly implemented these kinds of technological information control. But we have seen precursors. In 2004, The Government Printing Office (GPO) released its own annual report using a proprietary reader that requires registration, includes DRM, and has built in "audit controls" (Annual Report 2004 Zinio Interactive Version (Registration Required) -> Get the GPO 2004 Annual Report in digital form now!). Most recently, we have seen GPO use proprietary software with the "call home" feature to authenticate documents in its Authenticated Public and Private Laws, Beta Release. With this system "Users must be connected to the Internet in order to have the ability to validate a digital signature on a PDF document." While the document is still readable if a user is not connected to the Internet, the user cannot validate the document. While the document is readable using software other than Adobe Acrobat or Reader version 7 or later, validation does not work without this proprietary software.
In summary, Google video used proprietary software with phone-home DRM to deny access to files that users had legally paid for and downloaded. GPO has used and is using proprietary software for distribution of government information and it is using DRM "phone home" features in its attempt to technologically "authenticate" government documents. While GPO certainly is not claiming that it wants to withdraw access to distributed publications, the technology is there for it to do so and it is experimenting with it.
Think of the Google Video premium service story as a useful cautionary tale -- a warning of how information can be withdrawn even if digital files were deposited with FDLP libraries or downloaded by conscientious librarians and digital preservation projects. This is something that government information specialists, FDLP librarians, and citizens should be watching closely. I urge you to write your Congressional delegation and the copyright office and suggest an explicit government document exemption to the DMCA. And write GPO and ask for an explicit, written policy rejecting the use of DRM and proprietary software and proprietary formats.
More information
- Homefront Confidential Prepared by The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, SIXTH EDITION, September 2005, "How the War on Terrorism Affects Access to Information and the Public's Right to Know"
- Chronology of Disappearing Government Information (Data collected through May 8, 2002) Compiled by Barbara Miller for ALA/GODORT Education Committee With special assistance of Karrie Peterson
- Secret reclassification of US documents by Michele McGinnis, (2006-02-21)
- Secret Agreement Reveals Covert Program to Hide Reclassification from Public by James R. Jacobs (2006-04-20)
- The Technical is Political by James A. Jacobs and Karrie Peterson, Of Significance... 3(1) 2001, p.25-35. Association of Public Data Users. (Full text PDF file)
What really happened with Google Premium Video — Part one: DRM killed the files
As Daniel pointed out on Tuesday (Another Example of Access Bad, Ownership Good), when Google shut down its premium video service on August 15, it was able to prevent customers who had bought and paid for videos from Google from ever watching those videos again. But there is a bit more to the story -- and it has implications for how government information is distributed.
In this, Part One of a two part look at the issues, we examine how Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies and proprietary software allowed Google to make it impossible for users to watch videos that they had bought from Google even though they had downloaded the video files onto their own computers. In Part Two we examine why this story is important for government information specialists and Federal Depository Library Program (FDLP) librarians.
While it wasn't obvious from the initial news stories about this, Google used DRM and proprietary software to deny access to files users had paid for and downloaded. Although the Government Printing Office (GPO) has not used identical techniques, it has experimented with similar ones and has never explicitly rejected use of techniques that could provide government a way to deny access to information even if users have copies of files on their own computers. More on that below.
Google's premium video-purchase-and-download service overlapped with with Google's YouTube-like service, Google Video, which offers streaming video without charge and some free downloads. But in early 2006, Google announced a service as part of Google Video that would allow users to pay to rent or buy certain videos (such as NBA basketball games and TV shows such as CSI) and it is that service that changed this week and those videos that people purchased that they no longer can watch.
YouTube and Google Video use "streaming" video technology so that you watch the stream of video as it comes to you. It is also possible to download videos in some cases. But the Google premium video service allowed users to pay for videos, download them, keep the video files, and watch them without streaming or re-streaming the content. Customers had the files on their own computers and could copy them and put them on different machines as if they really did "own" them. But there was a catch.
Actually, there were three catches. First, users of this service had to download and install the proprietary "Google Player" software. (The software was originally downloadable from http://video.google.com/playerdownload but even the Google cache of that page disappeared this week.) It served a similar function to Windows Media Player or Quicktime or other media players, but it used its own proprietary format (".gvi"). Only the Google Player could play Google Videos.
Second, you could watch the proprietary format using the proprietary player only if you were connected to the internet and authenticated yourself as the purchaser.
Since the Google Player was the only player that could read the files one purchased, users were locked-in to the DRM of authentication-over-the-internet (sometimes called the "phone home" feature). So, even if you paid for a video and "owned" the file you downloaded, you couldn't watch it unless Google allowed you to do so -- every time you watched it. This week Google simply turned off the ability for users to authenticate. Presumably, this is the way the Google rental service operated from the start: after 24 hours, you no longer had permission to view the file you downloaded. It turned out that the "purchase" program was just a temporary service as well.
This is why The Guardian described the situation this way:
Google handed opponents of digital rights management (DRM) a huge weapon this week when it announced that DRM-protected videos bought from its online video store will no longer work, and that customers will not be reimbursed.
-- Kiss goodbye to your DRM-protected Google Video clips, by Charles Arthur The Guardian, August 16 2007
And that brings us to the third catch: the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). Although there are hacks, work-arounds, and other technical tricks that allow one to circumvent the Google phone-home DRM, they are against the law. Again, The Guardian saw the implication of this for libraries:
But the fact that thousands of purchased files will cease working will give pause to organisations charged with creating public archives of published information - such as the British Library and, in the US, the Library of Congress. The latter in particular was anyway considering whether any redrafting is needed on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA): the idea of offering a loophole to circumvent DRM on products that no longer work properly was rejected in its last consideration. Google's decision might lead to a reversal in thinking.
There is more about this story and its implications for FDLP libraries in Part Two.
More information:
- Google Video robs customers of the videos they "own", BoingBoing August 10, 2007
- Google Video service to go black by Dawn C. Chmielewski and Alex Pham Los Angeles Times, August 11, 2007
- Google's permanent video sales less-than-permanent by Cade Metz, The Register, August 11, 2007
- Google Video DRM: Why is Hollywood more important than users? by Cory Doctorow, BoingBoing, February 14, 2006
- More On Google Copy Protection by Mike Masnick, TechDirt, Mon, Jan 9th 2006
- Google's Copy Protection: Supplying The Tools For Others To Be Evil by Mike Masnick, TechDirt, Fri, Jan 6th 2006
- Google Video (beta) by Troy Dreier, CNet, 2/7/06
- Google Video Player Terms and Conditions Google Video
- Good Uses for DRM Jimmy Palmer, DRM Blog (September 2. 2005) [good description of "phone home" DRM]
GPO, LOCKSS, IP Authentication, and the future of FDLP — more clarification needed
If you have not had a chance to read the message from Joseph P. Paskoski (Clarification on GPO LOCKSS report), I encourage you to do so. It does indeed help clarify GPO's intentions in ways that, I believe, seriously endanger long-term, free, public access to government information.
For those confused by the recent thread about GPO, LOCKSS, and IP authentication, allow me to try to summarize what we now know:
GPO is not "advocating" use of IP authentication for LOCKSS.
On the other hand, GPO is considering "an exclusive service for depository libraries" and is recommending exploring "other user authentication options" to implement such a system.
Further, GPO is only willing to "consider" (not guarantee) making content available without user authentication. This is evidently true of FDsys as well as any use of LOCKSS.
To me, this means that GPO is, indeed, planning a two-tier system of digital distribution: one exclusively for depository libraries (and, presumably, free) and, by implication, a second system presumably for the general public and based on cost recovery.
For this to work, GPO would have to do two things. First, it would have to restrict what FDLP libraries can do with the content they receive, either through technological locks or limitations, or licensing restrictions (including restrictions on re-distribution). Second, if GPO offered any content to the general public for free, it would have to offer similarly technologically dumbed-down, less-than-fully-functional, non-reusable content -- much the way Amazon offers one-page-at-a-time viewing of books as a teaser to get you to purchase the entire book. (For more on this see Why does GPO want to use IP Authentication?)
This model seems clear: distribution to depository libraries for free, but with limitations on use, location, and so forth; and distribution to the general public for a fee.
This sounds like an implementation of what GPO's strategic vision promised: a commitment to "free and ready public access to" government information "in partnership with Federal Depository libraries" while maintaining a separate, fee-based channel to meet its commitment to "distribute, on a cost recovery basis, copies of printed and electronic documents and other government information products to the general public," [emphasis added] (A strategic vision for the 21st century).
Why is this a threat to long-term, free, public access to government information? Imagine what such a system would look like to your users: They could use the net to get what they need, but they may have to pay or use a dumbed-down version. Or they could go offline, go to their library and use a "free" version, which would also have DRM or licensing restrictions, or both.
This is a far cry from DLC's underlying assumption that "much of the access to federal information resources is available 24/7 on the Internet" (Knowledge Will Forever Govern" A Vision Statement For Federal Depository Libraries In The 21st Century).
What this sounds like to me is a revival of the GPO bookstore concept for the digital age with the (fee-based) bookstore as the primary means of access to most government information and the go-to-the-library-building FDLP as the "free" path. This puts libraries and free access as second-tiers, non-networked alternatives for users. It would mean that libraries would be unable to participate in the open and free flow and re-use of government information (Web 2.0, Semantic Web, etc.). It is a vision of government information closer to Jack Valenti's vision of movie distribution than to Jefferson or Madison's visions of government information.
Imagine what this would mean to FDLP libraries and their ability to preserve access to information. Would systems like LOCKSS even be permitted? Or would locked-down-with-DRM or technologically-dumbed-down free versions made available to libraries be technically (or by license) un-preseravable?
I may be misinterpreting GPO's statements and I hope I am. I would welcome hearing further clarifications from GPO including that it does not intend to use DRM and that it does not intend to restrict what FDLP libraries or others can do with free content. I would welcome hearing from GPO that it does not intend to provide dumbed-down or technologically locked or functionally-disabled content for free while providing fully-functional content for a fee. I invite GPO to commit itself to open, free, reusable, preservable, distributable, unencumbered, fully-functional government information. I urge DLC to insist on digital distribution so that FDLP libraries can be fully functional online partners in the organization and preservation of government information and not by-standers who hope GPO will get funding to do so.
GPO could also show its good faith by continuing to study LOCKSS as one (not the exclusive) method of preservation and not just a method for distribution. The project could be expanded to include more than just e-journals. GPO could evaluate automated harvesting using tools that automatically create new directory structures and actively seek ways to help other depository libraries participate (e.g., reviewing automated harvesting).
Perhaps there can be some discussion of these issues at DLC.
Until we get further clarification, we'll all be left wondering.
Continue readingGPO LOCKSS Report: Why does GPO want to use IP Authentication?
GPO's report (GPO LOCKSS Pilot: Final Analysis, Government Printing Office, April 12, 2007), which analyzes the LOCKSS technology and announces GPO's findings and "future recommendations" on using LOCKSS, refers repeatedly to use of IP Authentication*. The document does not, however, discuss the need for IP authentication either in the pilot or in possible future implementations of LOCKSS for government information.
Since LOCKSS does not require IP Authentication, this raises interesting questions.
While it is reasonable to assume that GPO wanted to limit access to the documents it was using for the LOCKSS pilot project to those who were participating in the project, it is not clear why GPO would consider IP Authentication necessary for a live implementation of LOCKSS. But the report clearly states as an "Outstanding Issue":
IP authentication for over 1260 depositories would be cumbersome, and may not be cost effective in relation to the benefit received. (page 6)
And, later, the report stresses the costs of IP Authentication:
LOCKSS technology in itself appears to be relatively cost efficient as a distribution mechanism. Costs appear to be a bigger issue in relation to staff time required to ... administer IP authentication. (page 11)
Since the report does not explain why it would want to use IP Authentication for LOCKSS, we can only speculate why it includes it as a cost. Here are my speculations. I pose them as questions and would welcome answers from GPO.
- Is GPO planning to set up a special distribution system for depository libraries only? This would make sense if GPO wants to use this special distribution channel to meet its commitment to "free and ready public access to" government information "in partnership with Federal Depository libraries" while maintaining a separate, fee-based channel to meet its commitment to "distribute, on a cost recovery basis, copies of printed and electronic documents and other government information products to the general public," [emphasis added] (A strategic vision for the 21st century). For this to work, GPO would have to restrict what FDLP libraries can do with the content they receive, either through technological locks or limitations, or licensing restrictions. We have already seen a precursor to the use of licensing restricitions with the Library of Congress Subject Headings (See: GPO details onerous restrictions on digital materials). This seems to me the most likely reason for the inclusion of IP authentication in the report because it fits in well with the contradictory missions noted above of providing information for free and for a fee and with GPO's previous experience with this very contradiction. (Years ago, when GPO tried to charge for GPO Access, it tried to limit free use of it to those physically inside depository libraries. When that failed because libraries made the same content available on the net, GPO was forced to go to a model of making "it free to the general public." But, as Bruce James said, "This cannot continue." [See Summary, 2003 Fall Meeting Depository Library Council.]) The new model seems clear: "Free" to depository libraries, but with limitations on use, location, and so forth; and "Fee" to the general public.
- Is GPO planning a separate, FDLP-only distribution channel as a way of providing "authentication" of content? This would fit in well with GPO's consistently stated intention of being a "single authoritative resource" for digital Federal documents (A Strategic Vision). Information distributed through such a limited access channel could come with a special cachet of "being deposited" and FDLP libraries and no one else would be able to claim a special authenticity to such distribution. I do not think that it would be either necessary or wise to limit "authenticity" in this way, but, perhaps someone at GPO is thinking along those lines?
- Did those who wrote the report fail to consult policy makers within GPO and make a faulty assumption that GPO wants IP Authentication? This would indicate either that the report is incomplete or badly done.
- Did those who wrote the report fail to understand the technology they were describing and think IP Authentication was necessary to implement LOCKSS? This would also indicate that the report, and perhaps the entire evaluation process, was flawed badly.
- Is IP Authentication just a red-herring intended to confuse the issue, raise the theoretical costs of implementation, and provide evidence for GPO's conclusion that LOCKSS won't work for GPO? This would indicate that GPO, which in its own words only took on the pilot project after receiving "requests from research institutions, universities, depository libraries, and other Federal Government agencies to investigate using LOCKSS", never considered LOCKSS as a viable alternative. Indeed the report makes this fairly clear when it says that it "agreed" to the pilot project to test the LOCKSS technology "...as a potential precursor to GPO’s Future Digital System (FDsys)." [emphasis added]
None of these speculations are encouraging. They lead me to conclusions that do not augur well for free public access to public information. Again, I would welcome a response from GPO.
* In a library environment, "IP Authentication" normally refers to a process that allows access to licensed content. For example, the library subscribes to a journal collection or database and pays the vendor fees that allow certain computers (e.g. all those on a campus) to have access to that content. The library sends the addresses of those computers ("IP addresses") to the publisher. The publisher maintains a service that allows any request from one of those machines to get content. For more information, see Offering remote access to restricted resources by Marshall Breeding, Information Today, Volume 18 Number 18 (May 2001) p52-53.
Depository libraries can use IP Authentication to allow two and only two machines to have access to STAT-USA. (See "STAT-USA Offers Depositories IP Authentication Access" in Administrative Notes Newsletter of the Federal Depository Library Program Vol. 27, no. 03-04 GP 3.16/3-2:27/03-04 March 15/April 15, 2006.)
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A comment on government contracts and harvesting
April 16, 2008 / 2 Comments on A comment on government contracts and harvesting
Over the past week, there have been some good conversations about government contracts to digitize government information and the National Archives decision to not conduct a web harvest or snapshot at the end of the current Administration. There is good news and bad news.
The good news
The good news is that NARA's decision was not nearly as bad as it appeared to be when it was first announced in a memo on March 27, 2008, which was circulated only to Federal records officers (see: The National Archives Is Quietly Destroying Millions of Documents). In a thoughtful post on its web site (National Archives and Records Administration Web Harvest Background Information, April 15, 2008, NARA; pdf version available), NARA outlines in detail the reasons why it would not conduct an end of administration web snapshot or harvest of Executive Branch websites nor require agencies to do so. The reasons, I think, are sound and in keeping with NARA's commitment to preserving information of historical value.
In addition, the NARA memo of April 15 makes explicit the fact that its decision and memo of March 27 do not apply to Presidential records or to records of the Congress. It says that "NARA will continue to conduct a web harvest of Congressional web sites" and that NARA "will also receive a snapshot of the White House website" noting that "Unlike Federal agencies governed by the Federal Records Act, the White House is governed by the Presidential Records Act, under which all Presidential records are treated as permanent and transferred to NARA for preservation at a Presidential Library."
The NARA "Background Information" document is also, I think, worth reading for its clear description of the shortcomings of web harvests in general. I think it is very useful for us to be reminded of these shortcomings to the extent that we believe we can rely on them as an adequate form of preservation.
In more good news, the NARA/TGN contract is not as bad as it could have been. I mentioned this in my earlier post here (The NARA/TGN contract as a bad precedent) and similar comments have been made in the useful and interesting thread over at ArchivesNext (NARA latest digitization agreement: One archivist's perspective). Merrilee Proffitt, of RLG, says in a comment there that the NARA model for contracts with third parties "actually comes out looking pretty good" when compared to the criteria described in the RLG paper Good Terms - Improving Commercial-Noncommercial Partnerships for Mass Digitization (by Peter B. Kaufman and Jeff Ubois, D-Lib Magazine, November/December 2007, Volume 13 Number 11/12).
The bad news
The bad news, as James pointed out this morning, is that the GAO contract for digitizing is very bad indeed (GAO *did* sell exclusive access to legislative history to Thomson West). Quoting Carl Malamud, James notes that GAO gets access to the digitized data but does not get a copy of its own; the rest of the government doesn't even get access to the data. The public is left with the option of going to GAO headquarters and paying 20 cents per page to copy paper! As Carl says, "This is one of those deals where the public domain got sold off."
This morning there was more bad news. Kate at ArchivesNext reports that the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) has a new report Record Chaos: The Deplorable State of Electronic Record Keeping in the Federal Government, that concludes "that the federal government is severely mismanaging its electronic records." CREW also says that a House Committee proposal to amend federal record keeping laws "is anemic and fails to make the substantial changes necessary to bring the federal government into the 21st century."
And even the good news is tempered by the fact that we have less than we could and are a long way from an even an adequate system of permanent preservation of digital information or a long-term solution to digitizing non-digital information. We will have to hope that the White House will deliver a snapshot of the White House web site and that the snapshot will be accurate and complete. The behavior of the White House with regard to electronic records and email does not make us optimistic. The NARA/TGN deal is better than the GAO/Thomson deal, but still leaves much to be desired and, as pointed out even by defenders of the deal, it is unlikely that we will ever have free, open, networked access to the digital information that TGN digitizes. That means the real effect of the deal is to privatize the information.
Comment
For me, the biggest disappointment in these latest developments is that librarians and archivists seem to be too willing to accept "good enough" and not willing enough to argue harder for "better." There are lots of people who have good reason to argue for less access, more fees, less privacy, and more control of information, but librarians and archivists should not be among them. I believe that we should not spend time making the case for the private sector; it is fully capable of making its own case. We should spend our time fighting for free, full, open, public access, usability of information, and long term preservation.
The primary mission of private sector companies is to make money, not to serve the public. They may serve the public as a by-product of making money, but no for-profit company will go to its owners and say "we are going to do the best thing for public access" without the qualification "that will make us money." Unfortunately "making money" often conflicts with public access. Politicians (and some bureaucrats) will argue for greater control of government information; some will argue for secrecy of government information on the one hand and privacy-invading policies on the other. Most government agencies do not have information access or long term preservation of their information as a primary mission and the exceptions are notable (e.g. LOC, NARA).
In contrast, the primary mission of many libraries and archives is to provide free public open access with long term preservation and usability. While others may have some of those pieces as secondary goals, few if any have them all. For many libraries and archives these goals are not just their primary mission but their defining characteristic.
While digitization and digital preservation are neither easy nor inexpensive, that doesn't mean that we have to pay any and all costs for them. The digital era should be making it possible to provide better access without giving up free use and reuse, without giving up open access, without turning over control to those whose primary mission is something other than free, open, public access and long term preservation. But increasingly we see a combination of politics and economics leaving us with contracts that trump copyright and fair use, with "access" being negotiated at almost any cost (including loss of control), with DRM technologies that prohibit easy (or any) reuse, and with privacy protections being deprecated or even ignored. Even in the case of the NARA/TGN contract that is legally "better" than the GAO/Thomson contract, we are left with the effect of two-tiers of access and network access being essentially privatized and fee-based.
I believe that librarians and archivists should be pushing the boundaries and insisting for more and better, not accepting some benefits by negotiating away the big benefits we could be getting in the digital age. This is particularly important for government information that is in the public domain. If we can't make this work for public information that is not copyrighted, how will we be able to do so for information that is?
I'm not arguing for a perfect, ideal world that is impractical to achieve. I am suggesting that we should fight for everything we can get. We should celebrate when we make inroads with a contract (like NARA/TGN) that is better than the others (like GAO/Thomson) but we should do so by committing to doing better next time. We should not accept this as "good enough" -- because it is not and we can do better next time. In fact, every time we accept a less-than-perfect deal as "good enough," we make it a little harder to make a better deal next time. We lower the bar if we accept "good enough" and stop trying to achieve better. We should not take the time to convince ourselves or the public that this is as good as we can get; we should take that time to admit to the limitations and trade offs and to commit to doing better next time.
There is lots written these days about "the future of libraries" and "the role of libraries in the digital age" and many people openly wonder if there is a place for libraries at all. I think there are several places where libraries have a unique role to play in society and the areas of digitization and digital access and preservation are important ones.
We need to make the case for the public; for free, open, public access; for long-term preservation and usability; for public accountability in the control of information; for reader privacy. Librarians and archivists have a unique role in doing that. In doing so, we will face an uphill battle and trade offs, but we should never lose sight of our unique role in society. We should never cheapen our professions by making the case for less (there are plenty of people to do that). We should always make the case for more. We will not always succeed and we will have to make trade offs. But we should always do so in the context of staking out a territory that is different from the private sector and those who are willing to get less. We should stand up for rights that others are not willing to fight for. We must fight for it when there are so many forces aligned against free, open access.
I'd like to see us emulate Carl Malamud and CREW and Brewster Kahle more and do less of making excuses for TGN and Thomson.
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