news aggregator
Medicare May 2013 Baseline
Combined Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Trust Funds May 2013 Baseline
NTSB — Safety Report on Eliminating Impaired Driving
In a Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans
The coolest new public-sector tech at FOSE
CREW Releases New Report Examining the Influence of High Frequency Traders in Washington
Helmet legislation and admissions to hospital for cycling related head injuries in Canadian provinces and territories: interrupted time series analysis
“Swept Away” — Abuses against Sex Workers in China
DOJ Spectrum Plan Is Not Supported by Economic Theory or FCC Findings
Frontline relied on the DOJ foreclosure theory to predict that the lack of eligibility restrictions in the 700 MHz auction would “inevitably” increase prices, stifle innovation, and reduce the diversity of service offerings as Verizon and AT&T warehoused the spectrum. In reality, the exact opposite occurred.
The DOJ recently recommended that the FCC rig the upcoming incentive auction to ensure Sprint Nextel and T-Mobile are winners and Verizon and AT&T are losers. I previously noted that the DOJ spectrum plan (1) inconsistent with its own findings in recent merger proceedings and the intent of Congress, (2) inherently discriminatory, and (3) irrational as applied. Additional analysis indicates that it isn’t supported by economic theory or FCC factual findings either.
Economic Theory
The Phoenix Center published a paper with an economic simulation that exposes the fundamental economic defect in the foreclosure theory underlying the DOJ recommendation. The DOJ implicitly recognizes that the “private value” of spectrum (the amount a firm is willing to pay) equals its “use value” (derived from using spectrum to meet consumer demand) plus its “foreclosure value” (derived from excluding its use by rivals). In its application of this theory, however, the DOJ erroneously presumes that Verizon and AT&T would derive zero use value from the acquisition of additional spectrum – a presumption that is inconsistent with the FCC findings that prompted the auction.
The Phoenix Center notes that all firms – including Sprint Nextel and T-Mobile – derive a foreclosure value from the acquisition of spectrum due to its scarcity. When considering the benefits to consumers, it is the comparative use value of the spectrum for each provider that is relevant. If the use value of the spectrum to Verizon and AT&T exceeds that of Sprint Nextel and T-Mobile, economic theory says Verizon and AT&T would maximize the potential consumer benefits of that spectrum irrespective of its foreclosure value.
Of course, determining the differing use values of spectrum to particular firms is what spectrum auctions are for, which brings the DOJ’s argument full circle: If government bureaucrats at the DOJ and the FCC could accurately assess the use values of spectrum, we wouldn’t need to hold spectrum auctions in the first place.
The circularity of the DOJ theory explains its reliance on an unsubstantiated presumption that Sprint Nextel and T-Mobile have the highest use value for the spectrum. If the DOJ had instead (1) conducted a thorough factual investigation, (2) analyzed the resulting data to assign bureaucratic use values for the spectrum to each of the four nationwide mobile providers, and (3) compared the results to determine that Verizon and AT&T had lower use values, the DOJ would have engaged in the same failed “comparative hearing” analysis that Congress intended to avoid when it authorized spectrum auctions. Given the Congressional mandate to auction spectrum yielded by the broadcasters, the FCC cannot engage in a comparative process to pick winners and losers, and it certainly cannot substitute an unsubstantiated presumption for an actual comparative process in order to avoid the legal prohibition.
FCC Factual Findings
The foreclosure theory and DOJ presumption are also inconsistent with the auction experience and current factual findings of the FCC. The DOJ foreclosure theory has been presented to the FCC before and has proved invalid by the market.
When the FCC was developing rules for the 700 MHz auction in 2007, Frontline Wireless sought preferential treatment using the same foreclosure theory as the DOJ. Frontline submitted a paper (prepared by Stanford professors of economics and management) that relied on the same types of information and reached the same conclusion as the DOJ – that Verizon and AT&T were dominant “low-frequency” wireless incumbents with “strong incentives” to acquire and warehouse 700 MHz spectrum, and that their participation in the 700 MHz auction must be limited in order to “promote competition” and prevent “foreclosure.” Frontline predicted that, if Verizon and AT&T were not prevented from bidding in the 700 MHz auction, it would “inevitably lead to higher prices, stifled innovation, and reduced diversity of service offerings.”
The FCC rejected Frontline’s foreclosure theory. The FCC concluded that, “given the number of actual wireless providers and potential broadband competitors, it [was] unlikely that [incumbents] would be able to behave in an anticompetitive manner as a result of any potential acquisition of 700 MHz spectrum.”
The last five years have proven that the FCC was correct. Though Verizon and AT&T acquired significant amounts of unfettered 700 MHz spectrum, the auction results have not led to the “higher prices, stifled innovation, and reduced diversity of service offerings” predicted by Frontline. In its most recent mobile competition report, the FCC reported that:
- Verizon used its 700 MHz spectrum to deploy a 4G LTE network to more than 250 million Americans less than four years after Verizon’s 700 MHz licenses were approved (i.e., it didn’t warehouse the spectrum).
- Mobile wireless prices declined overall in 2010 and 2011, and the price per megabyte of data declined 89% from the 3rd quarter of 2008 – a few months before Verizon received its 700 MHz licenses – to the 4th quarter of 2010 (i.e., industry prices decreased).
- The number of subscribers to mobile Internet access services more than doubled from year-end 2009 to year-end 2011 (i.e., industry output increased).
- Prepaid services are growing at the fastest rate, and new wholesale and connected device services are growing significantly (i.e., providers continued to provide new and diverse service offerings).
- Market concentration has remained essentially unchanged since 2008 (the population weighted average of HHIs increased from 2,842 in 2008 to 2,873 in 2011 – a change of only 1 percent).
Remember: Frontline relied on the DOJ foreclosure theory to predict that the lack of eligibility restrictions in the 700 MHz auction would “inevitably” increase prices, stifle innovation, and reduce the diversity of service offerings as Verizon and AT&T warehoused the spectrum. In reality, the exact opposite occurred. Verizon and AT&T did not warehouse the spectrum, industry prices decreased while output increased, diverse new service offerings exhibited the strongest growth, and market concentration remained essentially unchanged. And, while competition thrived, consumers reaped the benefits.
So, why would the DOJ make the same failed argument for the 600 MHz auction (other than crony capitalism)? Some might say, “Even the boy who cried wolf was right once.” But, even if one were inclined to give the DOJ the benefit of the doubt, the theoretical possibility that the foreclosure theory could adversely impact the 600 MHz auction must be weighed against the potential harm of limiting participation in the auction.
The harm is well documented and could prove particularly problematic in this auction. A paper coauthored by Leslie Marx, who led the design team for the 700 MHz auction when she was the FCC’s Chief Economist, demonstrates that excluding Verizon and AT&T would have even more severe consequences in the incentive auction than in previous auctions.
A paper published by economists at Georgetown University’s Center for Business and Public Policy attempts to quantify the severity of these consequences. It estimates that excluding Verizon and AT&T from the auction could reduce revenues by as much as 40 percent ($12 billion) – a result that would jeopardize funding for the nationwide public safety network, reduce the amount of spectrum made available for wireless Internet services, and adversely affect more than 118,000 U.S. jobs. That is a steep price to pay for the privilege of seeing whether the boy is crying wolf again.
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administraion — Inappropriate Criteria Were Used to Identify Tax-Exempt Applications for Review
Updated Edition of Benchbook Now Available
Reaching Zero: Actions to Eliminate Alcohol-Impaired Driving
Final Audit Report: Inappropriate Criteria Were Used To Identify Tax-Exempt Applications for Review
BIS - Consumer Inflation Expectations in Turkey
NTSB - Safety Report on Eliminating Impaired Driving
El TPP Amenaza La Libertad En Internet
This article has been written by Miguel Morachimo, Executive Director, Hiperderecho and Katitza Rodriguez, EFF International Rights Director
Hoy día nuestro gobierno se reunirá en Lima con los representantes de Estados Unidos y otros diez estados para discutir el Acuerdo de Asociación Transpacífico (TPP). Este es un nuevo acuerdo comercial en negociación entre los países del Asía Pacífico muy poco discutido en nuestro país. Sin embargo, en países como Japón, Chile o Nueva Zelanda es objeto de intenso debate porque su texto no sólo habla de libre comercio sino también regula temas tan delicados como acceso a medicamentos, libertad de expresión e innovación en entornos digitales.
El texto del acuerdo es secreto aunque hace dos años se filtró el capítulo de Propiedad Intelectual propuesto por Estados Unidos, que contenía disposiciones alarmantes para los derechos fundamentales, la innovación tecnológica y la Internet. Para muchos académicos y usuarios de Internet, esta propuesta remite al polémico proyecto de ley SOPA o al tratado ACTA, ambos rechazados mayoritariamente por afectar libertades y derechos en línea. Con el TPP, Estados Unidos regresa sobre la misma estrategia y plantea exportar algunos de los peores aspectos de su ley de derechos de autor.
La respuesta del gobierno peruano hasta ahora ha sido asegurar que el TPP no es distinto del Tratado de Libre Comercio (TLC) suscrito con Estados Unidos en el 2007. Sin embargo, nada respalda esta declaración ya que no conocemos el texto real del tratado y el capítulo de propiedad intelectual filtrado hace dos años, aunque similar en estructura, va más allá que nuestro TLC con Estados Unidos en varios aspectos. Peor aún, todo lo que conocemos tiene dos años de antigüedad y fue solo la propuesta inicial de Estados Unidos. Nos preocupa el espacio que pueden tener los países dominantes en la negociación luego de que muchos países como Perú han anticipado su entusiasmo por firmar el TPP a toda costa.
.
Privacy info. This embed will serve content from youtube-nocookie.comLa propuesta de Estados Unidos amplía todavía más los plazos y supuestos de protección, reduce excepciones que favorecen al público en general y plantea endurecer aún más varias de las ya estrictas medidas de aplicación de los derechos de autor del TLC. Así, por ejemplo, obliga que los intermediarios en Internet (como las empresas prestadoras de servicio o las propias páginas web) colaboren con los titulares de contenidos protegidos por derechos de autor retirando, bloqueando e identificando a los usuarios que comentan infracciones en sus redes. La negativa a formar parte de este sistema de privado de justicia puede conllevar responsabilidad por parte de las empresas intermediarias. Este es un tema que ya estaba en nuestro TLC, que todavía no hemos implementado localmente, y que Estados Unidos podría intentar llevar más allá, en vista de sus recientes proyectos legislativos sobre el tema (ej. SOPA, PIPA, ACTA). Un sistema privado de justicia no sólo ponen en riesgo la libertad de expresión y la privacidad de los usuarios de Internet sino que también significan una carga excesiva para la mayoría de empresas intermediarias en Internet, lo que aumenta los costos para cualquier emprendedor empresa local nueva o start up que desea hacer negocios por Internet.
De la misma manera, se establece una prohibición amplia de romper las cerraduras digitales o medidas de protección tecnológica que se colocan en los soportes o archivos que contienen obras (e.g. software, libros y videos). Esta disposición crea un nuevo derecho de acceso a una obra digital, una protección que está por encima de la protección del derechos de autor. La norma responsabiliza a quien rompa un candado digital que controla el acceso a las obras protegidas incluso si aquel acceso no está asociado a una infracción a los derechos de autor (e.g. copiar y pegar un extracto de un libro electrónico o ripear un DVD de música y pasarlo a tu iPod), salvo un número sumamente limitado de excepciones. Una aplicación estricta de esta norma colocaría a discapacitados visuales, investigadores, usuarios de software libre y desarrolladores informáticos en la ilegalidad. Si bien estas disposiciones tienen el propósito legítimo de proteger a los titulares de derechos de autor contra el uso no autorizado de sus obras digitales, disposiciones similares en los Estados Unidos han demostrado ser demasiado amplias, y en los últimos 15 años se han utilizado para muchos fines diferentes a los previstos por el Congreso de EE.UU. que no tienen nada que ver con el uso de obras no autorizadas por los derechos de autor.
Pero los acuerdos internacionales de derechos de autor como el TPP no solo afectan a usuarios y empresas locales de Internet. También significan un obstáculo para las reformas tan necesarias a la ley de derecho de autor en Perú, donde no existen suficiente excepciones para el uso legítimo de obras en el entorno digital ni siquiera para que las bibliotecas públicas o privadas presten películas. Sin embargo, sí tenemos una excepción escrita que permite que las tiendas que venden televisores puedan exhibir series o películas al público. Asumir obligaciones internacionales también asfixian nuestra libertad para crear y mejorar nuestras propias leyes haciéndose más difícil cambiar nuestras leyes locales al atarse a un estándar legal que no elegimos democráticamente y que no se adapta a nuestras necesidades locales. Incluso si esas obligaciones internacionales no se trasladan a las normas locales inmediatamente, estarán a disposición de grupos de presión y lobbystas para que obliguen a nuestro Congreso y autoridades a adoptarlas o detener reformas positivas y modernas bajo pena de sanciones internacionales.
No nos oponemos al libre comercio ni a la apertura de mercados. Nos oponemos a que los tratados de libre comercio regulen libremente nuestros derechos y libertades esenciales de espaldas al público en general. Creemos que medidas de ese tipo pueden tener un efecto negativo en la inversión local, nuestra economía y nuestros derechos fundamentales. Si tú también crees que el Estado debe de fijar límites no negociables en el TPP, te pedimos que te unas a la petición en línea propuesta por un grupo de organizaciones de la sociedad civil ingresando a http://www.nonegociable.pe/. Con el TPP, Todos Podemos Perder.
Más informaciónTPP: Todos Podemos Perder por Katitza Rodríguez y Miguel Morachimo (resumen ejecutivo para la prensa)
Privacy info. This embed will serve content from youtube.comPrivacy info. This embed will serve content from youtube-nocookie.com
var mytubes = new Array(3); mytubes[1] = '%3Ciframe src=%22https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/EoegFtuOG70?autoplay=1%22 allowfullscreen=%22%22 frameborder=%220%22 height=%22360%22 width=%22640%22%3E%3C/iframe%3E'; mytubes[2] = '%3Ciframe src=%22http://www.youtube.com/embed/-YWVeERMJMs??autoplay=1%22 allowfullscreen=%22%22 frameborder=%220%22 height=%22360%22 width=%22640%22%3E%3C/iframe%3E'; mytubes[3] = '%3Ciframe src=%22https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/IlUuDFWAsZw?autoplay=1%22 allowfullscreen=%22%22 frameborder=%220%22 height=%22360%22 width=%22640%22%3E%3C/iframe%3E'; Related Issues: Intellectual PropertyInternationalTrans Pacific Partnership Agreement
Share this: || Join EFF
A graphic look at procurement reform
Spreading the word about cybersecurity
Data Journalism: GIJN?s Global Guide to Resources
May 15-18, 1912 : Detroit Tigers Stage First Baseball Strike
When Ty Cobb was suspended for beating up a heckler during a game with the New York Highlanders (soon to be Yankees) on May 15, 1912, the rest of the team refused to play the next scheduled game. However, the Tiger's management signed up replacement players so the game went on. The Tigers watched from the stands on May 18 but returned to play the next game.
Source : The First Baseball Strike, excerpt from Bygone baseball by C. Philip Francis.
For another account, see Baseball's First Strike, Philly Sport History, May 18, 2011.
Source : Michigan History, May/June 2011.
Original post blogged on b2evolution.

